晴读（32）：精读期刊论文

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“晴读（32）：精读期刊论文《基于委托代理理论的逆向供应链激励机制设计与回收模式选择》的引言”

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"Qing Du (32): Introduction of the Journal Paper Design of Incentive Mechanism and Selection of Recycling Mode in Reverse Supply Chain Based on Principal-Agent Theory"

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今天小编将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个板块为大家带来《基于委托代理理论的逆向供应链激励机制设计与回收模式选择》的引言。

一、思维导图（Mind Map）

二、内容精读（Conduct in-depth reading of the material）

1.研究背景与现实问题提出。该部分以资源短缺和环境污染加剧的宏观背景为切入点，指出逆向供应链管理模式已在工业生产中广泛应用，同时明确回收过程受多种不确定性因素制约；随后通过中国家用电器研究院和光明网的权威数据，直观呈现2021年我国废旧产品理论报废量与实际回收量、手机社会保有量与回收利用率之间的巨大差距，凸显回收效率低下的现实问题；接着结合富士施乐爱科制造因回收量不足亏损、美国ReCellular通过激励契约实现高回收量与市场份额的正反案例对比，揭示回收渠道效率与激励机制对企业收益的关键影响；最终从委托代理关系视角，将问题归因于回收商能力禀赋信息不对称导致的逆向选择，以及回收行为不可观测引发的道德风险，进而提出核心研究问题——在逆向选择和道德风险并存下，如何设计有效激励契约以合理分配利益、提高回收效率。

1. Research Background and Proposal of Practical Problems. This section starts with the macro background of the growing shortage of resources and worsening environmental pollution, pointing out that the reverse supply chain management model, which aims to realize the recycling and reuse of waste products, has been widely applied in industrial production. At the same time, it clarifies that the recycling process is restricted by various uncertain factors. Subsequently, based on authoritative data from the China Household Electrical Appliances Research Institute and Guangming Network, it intuitively presents the huge gap between the theoretical scrap volume and actual recycling volume of waste products in China in 2021, as well as between the social ownership of mobile phones and the mobile phone recycling rate, highlighting the practical problem of low recycling efficiency. Then, by comparing the positive and negative cases—Aike Manufacturing under Fuji Xerox suffering losses due to insufficient recycling volume, and ReCellular (the largest mobile phone remanufacturer in the United States) achieving high recycling volume and market share through signing recycling incentive contracts with distributors and third-party recyclers—it reveals the key impact of recycling channel efficiency and incentive mechanisms on corporate profits. Finally, from the perspective of the principal-agent relationship, it attributes the problem to adverse selection caused by information asymmetry in recyclers' capability endowments and moral hazard caused by the unobservability of recycling behaviors, and further puts forward the core research question: under the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard, how to design an effective incentive contract to reasonably distribute benefits and improve recycling efficiency.

2.回收渠道关系相关文献综述。此部分围绕逆向或闭环供应链的回收渠道治理展开梳理，首先回顾聚焦单一回收渠道的研究，如Han等对比零售商与制造商回收渠道收益、Zhang等分析平台模式与批发模式的最优策略、秦晓彤等结合网购偏好与零售服务探讨渠道占优情况，同时指出此类研究难以适配网络经济下多渠道回收的现实场景；随后转向双回收渠道竞争关系的研究，列举Esenduran等认为双渠道竞争有益供应链绩效、Saha等与Zheng等提出双零售渠道竞争下制造商回收最优，以及Fan等、卢荣花等、刘姗等分别从消费者意愿、产品生命周期、社会责任等角度分析竞争强度对渠道选择影响的成果；最后补充回收渠道合作关系的研究，以估吗与闲鱼、百度回收站与爱回收的合作案例为现实支撑，梳理Ma等认为合作可实现双赢、许民利等通过博弈模型分析合作中收益分配与成本分摊的少量相关研究，全面呈现当前回收渠道关系研究的现状与范围。

2. Literature Review on Recycling Channel Relationships. This section sorts out the research on recycling channel governance in reverse or closed-loop supply chains. First, it reviews studies focusing on single recycling channels: for example, Han et al. compared the benefits of retailer-led and manufacturer-led recycling channels; Zhang et al. analyzed the optimal strategies of platform mode and wholesale mode for manufacturers; Qin Xiaotong et al. explored the dominant channel scenarios by considering online shopping preferences and retail services. Meanwhile, it points out that such studies are hardly applicable to the practical scenario of multi-channel recycling in the digital economy. Subsequently, it shifts to research on the competitive relationship of dual recycling channels, listing relevant findings: Esenduran et al. argued that dual-channel competition is beneficial to supply chain performance; Saha et al. and Zheng et al. proposed that manufacturer-led recycling is optimal under the competition of dual retail channels; Fan et al., Lu Ronghua et al., and Liu Shan et al. analyzed the impact of competition intensity on channel selection from the perspectives of consumer willingness, product life cycle, and social responsibility, respectively. Finally, it supplements the research on the cooperative relationship of recycling channels. With practical cases such as the cooperative recycling partnership between Guma and Xianyu (established in 2017) and between Baidu Recycling Station and Aihuishou (established in 2018) as support, it sorts out a small number of relevant studies: Ma et al. believed that cooperation between two recyclers can improve the overall operational efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain and achieve a win-win outcome; Xu Minli et al. constructed a game model to analyze the profit distribution and cost-sharing in cooperation, indicating that the probability of recyclers choosing cooperative strategies is the highest under the optimal excess profit distribution rate and joint cost-sharing rate. This section comprehensively presents the current status and scope of research on recycling channel relationships.

3.信息不对称与激励契约文献综述。该部分先指出前述回收渠道关系研究多基于信息对称假设，与回收业务外包中制造商和回收商目标不一致、信息不对称的现实脱节，进而引出信息不对称这一关键变量；接着梳理单一信息不对称问题的研究，包括Li等、Zheng等、Zhao等、李芳等针对回收商成本、效率等私有信息导致逆向选择的研究，以及聂佳佳等、张令荣等针对回收努力等私有行为引发道德风险的研究，同时指出此类研究仅关注单一信息问题的局限性；随后转向逆向选择与道德风险并存的双重信息不对称研究，先引用Laffont和Martimort的理论观点强调现实契约需解决双重问题，再梳理Armstrong等、Yang等、田厚平、Bolandifar等、Huang等、姚冠新等、王璐等在薪酬契约、供应链产能投资、物流保鲜等领域的相关成果，最后精准定位逆向供应链领域的研究缺口——现有研究未探讨双回收渠道（竞争/合作）下逆向选择与道德风险并存的情况，为本文研究奠定基础。

3. Literature Review on Information Asymmetry and Incentive Contracts. This section first points out that the aforementioned studies on recycling channel relationships are mostly based on the assumption of information symmetry, which is disconnected from the reality of recycling business outsourcing—where manufacturers and recyclers have inconsistent goals and information asymmetry—thus introducing information asymmetry as a key variable. Next, it sorts out studies on single information asymmetry issues: this includes studies by Li et al., Zheng et al., Zhao et al., and Li Fang et al., which focus on adverse selection caused by private information of recyclers (such as cost and efficiency); and studies by Nie Jiajia et al. and Zhang Lingrong et al., which focus on moral hazard caused by private behaviors of recyclers (such as recycling efforts). At the same time, it points out the limitation of these studies, i.e., they only focus on a single information-related issue. Subsequently, it shifts to research on dual information asymmetry where adverse selection and moral hazard coexist. It first cites the theoretical perspective of Laffont and Martimort, which emphasizes that real-world contracts need to address both issues simultaneously. Then, it sorts out relevant research findings in fields such as compensation contracts, supply chain capacity investment, and logistics preservation: including studies by Armstrong et al., Yang et al., Tian Houping, Bolandifar et al., Huang et al., Yao Guanxin et al., and Wang Lu et al. Finally, it accurately identifies the research gap in the field of reverse supply chains—existing studies have not explored the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard under dual recycling channels (competitive/cooperative)—laying the foundation for this study.

4.研究目标、内容与关键问题。此部分明确阐述研究核心目标，即针对逆向选择和道德风险并存的情况，基于回收渠道竞争或合作关系设计最优激励契约，实现回收商信息甄别与努力激励，并确定制造商最优回收模式；随后说明具体研究内容与技术路径，包括描述回收商能力禀赋信息不对称特征及竞争/合作中努力行为的相互作用，构建能力信息对称与不对称下的激励模型，分析信息结构和渠道关系对制造商契约安排与回收模式决策的影响，以及通过数值分析验证模型、揭示管理意义；最后以三个关键问题聚焦研究重点，分别探讨能力私有信息与努力不可观测对激励机制的影响、不同回收模式下激励契约的机制特征差异，以及渠道竞争/合作强度、回收商能力禀赋对回收模式决策的影响，形成完整的研究逻辑闭环，为后续研究开展指明方向。

4. Research Objectives, Content, and Key Questions. This section clearly expounds the core research objective: in the context of the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard, design an optimal incentive contract based on the competitive or cooperative relationship of recycling channels to realize the identification of recyclers' information and the incentive for recyclers' optimal efforts, and determine the optimal recycling mode for manufacturers. Subsequently, it specifies the specific research content and technical path, including describing the characteristics of information asymmetry in recyclers' capability endowments and the interaction of effort behaviors in competition/cooperation, constructing incentive models under both symmetric and asymmetric capability information, analyzing the impact of information structure and channel relationship on manufacturers' contract arrangements and recycling mode decisions, and verifying the model through numerical analysis to reveal management implications. Finally, it focuses on the research priorities through three key questions: exploring the impact of private capability information and unobservable efforts on the incentive mechanism, analyzing the differences in the mechanism characteristics of incentive contracts under different recycling modes, and investigating how the intensity of channel competition/cooperation and recyclers' capability endowments affect the decision-making of recycling modes. This forms a complete research logic loop and points out the direction for subsequent research.

三、知识补充（Supplementary Knowledge）

1.定价缺口：指在供应链交易中，不同主体（如制造商与回收商、供应商与零售商）因目标利益、信息掌握程度或市场地位差异，对同一产品或服务的定价预期不一致，形成的价格认知或实际定价的差距，可能导致交易效率降低或合作受阻。

1. Pricing Gap: It refers to the gap in price perception or actual pricing formed when different entities in supply chain transactions (such as manufacturers and recyclers, suppliers and retailers) have inconsistent pricing expectations for the same product or service due to differences in target interests, information mastery, or market status. This gap may lead to reduced transaction efficiency or hindered cooperation.

2.私有信息：指供应链中某一主体独自掌握、其他主体无法轻易获取的信息，比如回收商的真实回收成本、自身能力禀赋，或制造商的生产成本细节等，这类信息不对称可能引发逆向选择、道德风险等问题。

2. Private Information. It refers to information that is exclusively held by one entity in the supply chain and cannot be easily obtained by other entities. Examples include recyclers' actual recycling costs, their own capability endowments, or details of manufacturers' production costs. Such information asymmetry may give rise to issues such as adverse selection and moral hazard.

3.供应链绩效：衡量供应链整体运作效果的指标，涵盖回收量、回收率、利润水平、成本控制、资源利用效率等维度，比如双回收渠道竞争常被认为能提升供应链绩效，而信息不对称则可能导致供应链绩效下降。

3. Supply Chain Performance. It refers to the indicators used to measure the overall operational effectiveness of a supply chain, covering dimensions such as recycling volume, recycling rate, profit level, cost control, and resource utilization efficiency. For instance, competition in dual recycling channels is generally believed to improve supply chain performance, while information asymmetry may lead to a decline in supply chain performance.

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文案|hu

排版|hu

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翻译：ChatGPT

参考资料：ChatGPT,百度百科

参考文献: 许明辉,袁睢秋,秦颖,等. 基于委托代理理论的逆向供应链激励机制设计与回收模式选择 [J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(3): 297-313.

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